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Forcing States to Be Free: The Emerging
Constitutional Guarantee of Radical Democracy

JAMES

A. GARDNER*

Politicians are accustomed to watching their backs; it comes with the
territory. Even so, in the just-completed 2002 election cycle, candidates
for office seemed even jumpier than usual, and for good reason. After the
Supreme Court's astonishing eleventh-hour intervention in the 2000 presidential election, candidates all over the nation, and particularly those
standing for federal office, were understandably worried that the Court,
perhaps emboldened by the lack of any serious public backlash against its
ruling in Bush v. Gore,' might decide to involve itself again. Predictably,
the election presented numerous potentially tempting opportunities for federal judicial intervention.
In New Jersey, incumbent Democratic Senator Robert Torricelli withdrew from the senatorial race thirty-six days before
the election.2 The state Democratic Party quickly named retired Senator Frank Lautenberg to replace Torricelli on the
ballot, despite a state statute appearing to prohibit such a replacement later than 51 days before the election.3 This move
prompted a legal challenge from the Republican candidate. In
a quick and badly reasoned decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court sustained the replacement. 4 The Republicans sought an
emergency stay from the U.S. Supreme Court.5
Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at Buffalo Law School. Thanks to
Bert Westbrook for comments on a previous draft.
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 Ronald Brownstein, Democrats Fight For Senate; N.J. 's Embattled Torricelli
Bows Out to Help
Party Keep Control, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 2002, at Al, LEXIS, News Library, ORSENT File.
3Id.
4 N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002), application
for stay denied,
123 S.Ct.
67 (2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 673 (2002).
5
1d.
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In Hawaii, Representative Patsy Mink died thirty-eight days
before the election-three days after the statutory deadline for

the Democratic Party to replace her on the ballot.6 Governor

Benjamin Cayetano petitioned the Hawaii Supreme Court to
permit the party nevertheless to replace Mink with a new candidate.7 The court denied the petition.'
*

In Minnesota, incumbent Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone

died in a plane crash just five days before the election, and after absentee ballots containing Wellstone's name had already
been issued to absentee voters. 9 The state Democratic party
named former Vice President Walter Mondale to replace Wellstone on the ballot, prompting a challenge to the Secretary of
State's administration of the candidate replacement process.10
The Minnesota Supreme Court issued an order ratifying the replacement and establishing complex ground rules for the handling of absentee and mail ballots."'
"

In Dallas County, Texas; Camden County, New Jersey; Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, Florida; and Montgomery
County, Maryland, new touch-screen voting machines malfunctioned, failing in some cases to record votes properly and
causing county-to-county procedural variations of a type called
into question in Bush v. Gore.12

*

In Illinois, a federal district court and a state appellate court issued rulings that conflicted on the question of whether state-

wide standards for canvassing ballots satisfied the consistency
6 Shapiro Treena, Democrats Urge Voters to Pick Mink, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Sept. 30, 2002,

at IA, LEXIS, News Library, HONADV File.
7 Cayetano v. Yoshina, No. 25384, 2002 WL 31272361, at * 1 (Haw. Oct. 9,
2002).
88ld.
9 See Lara Weber & Kris Kamopp, Court Orders New Ballots, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2002, at 8,
LEXIS,0 News Library, CHTRIB File.
d.
IIErlandson v. Kiffmeyer, No. C7-02-1879 (Minn. Oct. 31,2002) (per curiam).
12Annie Gowen, Glitches Dim Bright Hopes; Spark Lines, Long Delays, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
2002, at BI; Ed Housewright, County Tries to Prevent More Ballot Problems; Working to Reduce the
Margin for Early- Voting Error; Controversy Over Touch-Screen Machines Still a Partisan Wedge,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Oct. 24, 2002, at 23A, LEXIS, News Library, DALNWS File; Jeff Kunerth et
al., What a Relief: Election Day Nearly Glitch-Free; "We finally have this monkey off our backs."
Secretary of State Jim Smith Declared, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16, LEXIS, News
Library, ORSENT File; Jeremy Milarsky, Glitch Forces 2 Areas to Alter Election Plans; Ballot Mistake Surfaces in Early Voting, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 23, 2002, at 6B, LEXIS,
New Library, SUNSEN File; Zay N. Smith, Hey. If It Ain't Broke, Who's Gonna Fix It?, CHI. SUNTIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at 54, LEXIS, News Library, CHISUN File.
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Gore. 3

In Georgia, supporters of incumbent Democrat Cynthia
McKinney filed suit challenging the results of a Democratic
congressional primary won by McKinney's challenger. 4 The
plaintiffs alleged that improper crossover voting by white Republicans violated the Voting Rights Act and Democrats' constitutionally protected rights of association. 5
In the event, nothing happened. The Supreme Court declined to hear
the New Jersey case on an expedited basis, and denied certioraria month
after the election. 6 A few federal lawsuits were filed, but none resulted in
an interruption of the political process. Consequently, if any issues raised
by the 2002 races are handled by the federal judiciary, they will be handled
in the normal course, creating law prospectively for application in future
election cycles.
The 2002 election cycle, then, was typical of the way the electoral process now occurs in the United States. Elections were conducted under the
shadow of federal judicial intervention, but not primarily as an artifact of
the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. To be sure, Bush v. Gore
revealed a willingness that the Court had not previously displayed to intervene in the electoral process in the short term on behalf of particular candidates. But federal judicial intervention in the electoral process in the normal course of federal litigation, by way of prospective rulings that alter the
constitutional ground rules and thus the structure and outcomes of electoral
politics, is, at this point, hardly news.
Indeed, it has been forty years since an election cycle did not occur under the shadow of federal judicial intervention. Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, election results were constantly threatened by the Court's equal
protection decisions on apportionment and ballot access. The Court's 1976
decision in Buckley v. Valeo 7 generated a spate of First Amendment challenges to electoral regulatory structures throughout the 1980s. During the
1990s, federal courts threatened constantly to intervene in elections on
13Compare Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. III. 2002) (holding
plaintiffs

had stated a claim under Bush v. Gore in challenging the state's approval of county decisions to use
unreliable and error-prone voting systems such as punch cards), with Graham v. Reid, 779 N.E.2d 391,
395 (111.App. Ct. 2002) (rejecting Bush v. Gore challenge to deviations among precincts in method of
performing recounts on ground that state had supplied statewide standards sufficient to prevent arbitrary treatment of voters).
14 R. Robin McDonald, Lawyers Prepare to Challenge Elections, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Nov. 1, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, FULTON File.
15Osbum v. Cox (N.D. Ga. 2002).
16 N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 123 S.Ct. 673 (2002).
17424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam).
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claims of reverse racial discrimination following Supreme Court decisions
in a line of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno.'8 Federal judicial oversight
of the kind anticipated during the 2002 election cycle-and which may yet
occur in its aftermath-has simply become a routine feature of the American political process.
Nevertheless, while federal judicial intervention in elections on constitutional grounds is nothing new, the grounds of intervention have begun
to shift in the last two decades in ways that make the more recent interventions different from, and far more troubling than, their predecessors. Some
very recent decisions by the Supreme Court now make it possible to recognize a trend. I shall argue in this Commentary that the Court has been
slowly identifying, developing, and now strictly enforcing against the
states what it apparently believes to be a constitutionally mandatory regime
of radical democracy in state-level politics.
This imperative of radical democracy appears to have three salient
characteristics. First, it establishes an exceedingly strong presumption
against the constitutionality of any significant regulatory limitation on the
way in which state politics is conducted. Second, where state regulation is
permitted, any regulation of the process by which federal officials are
elected is to be undertaken only by the most democratic organ of state government-the state legislature-without any participation by other
branches of state government. Third, when a state legislature undertakes
such regulation, it should do so lawlessly-unconstrained, that is to say, by
any state level, self-imposed limitations on the legislative power, and limited only by its own internal sense of democratic self-restraint. In other
words, under the Court's emerging model of radical democracy, the U.S.
Constitution insists upon a state politics that translates majoritarian desires
as directly as possible into electoral outcomes, preferably without any kind
of regulatory interference at all, and if regulation occurs, it must be undertaken by the institution of state government most directly responsive to the
popular will. Thus, in state politics, electoral outcomes must reflect as
much as possible raw majoritarian political power-whether or not the
state desires a politics of that kind. Most do not.
This turn of events is fraught with irony. The U.S. Constitution contains a provision expressly guaranteeing to the states a certain form of government, but it is a "republican" form of government'g--a form that is the
very antithesis of radical democracy, one intended explicitly to counteract
what the Framers viewed, with great distaste, as the undesirable excesses
of democracy. Moreover, the Court has consistently held for more than
150 years that claims raised under the constitutional provision guaranteeing
18509 U.S. 630 (1993).
0

U.S. CONST. art. W, § 4 (stating that "[tlhe United States shall guarantee to every State in this

Union a Republican Form of Government").
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states a republican form of government are nonjusticiable political questions,20 thereby disabling the federal judiciary from entertaining them.
Thus, the Court's current inclinations lead it to leave ignored and unenforced an express constitutional provision requiring states to maintain republican government, while at the same time teasing out of other provisions of the Constitution a diametrically opposed form of radical democracy subject to aggressive enforcement by judicial intervention in the state
political process.
Irony aside, the Court's embrace of radical democracy has been, on the
merits, an exceedingly bad development for American state and national
politics. In tilting toward radical democracy, the Court has shown itself
unable to distinguish regulatory structures that exclude people from politics, on one hand, from regulatory structures that merely constrainpeople's
behavior in politics, on the other. There is, to be sure, some overlap between these two types of regulations: severe constraints on political behavior can in some cases be tantamount to exclusion. But just as often,
regulation of the behavior of actors engaged in politics is meant to serve
very different and wholly legitimate ends. Among these are providing
regulatory incentives to political actors to behave in ways the state deems
desirable under some model of politics other than an unconstrained, radically democratic free-for-all. Up until recently, it has generally been assumed that states are constitutionally entitled to decide for themselves,
subject only to relatively narrow federal constitutional constraints, what
kind of politics to cultivate, and how to create regulatory structures to best
foster the emergence of the desired forms. Indeed, the Court's newly
minted federalism jurisprudence, developed over the same period, seems to
suggest that states ought to have precisely this form of discretion above all
others.2 Instead, the Court speaks broadly in one line of cases of the discretion afforded to states as sovereigns to order their own internal affairs,
while in the other flattening any state efforts to create political institutions
that differ from the Court's understanding of the single model approved by
the U.S. Constitution. If there is any connection between the two lines of
cases, it may be that the Court believes the Constitution imposes a model
of unconstrained pursuit of market power in politics just as it does in com20 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556

(1946); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 118-19 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
1, 47 (1849). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183-185 (1992) (stating that not all
claims under the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 175-76
(1874) (stating that the Guarantee Clause can be relied on when the state deprives citizens of the form
of government, but not when the state deprives some citizens of the right to vote).
21 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999). In such cases, the Supreme Court
has taken great pains to protect the sovereignty of states from federal invasion through the authorization
of unwanted private lawsuits.
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merce.
Part I of this Commentary explains the difference between radical
egalitarianism and radical democracy, and demonstrates how the focus of
the Court's jurisprudence of electoral regulation has slowly shifted from
the former to the latter. Part II then discusses the significant problems with
this development. I argue that the Court's enforcement of a constitutional
guarantee of radical democracy in state politics is ahistorical, conceptually
incoherent, and dangerous in that it operates to clear the way not for an
egalitarian democracy, but for a form of plutocratic oligarchy. Finally, Part
III sketches a few broad principles that might usefully guide future federal
judicial intervention in state politics.
I.

THE MOVE TOWARD RADICAL DEMOCRACY

A. RadicalEgalitarianismand Radical Democracy
To put current developments in perspective, it is necessary to distinguish between two related but nevertheless importantly distinct political
ideas: radical egalitarianism and radical democracy. Egalitarianism and
democracy are, of course, closely linked concepts. Contemporary notions
of democracy were scarcely possible before liberalism took as its first
premise the natural equality of human beings,22 an idea that permitted liberalism to deny the legitimacy of static social hierarchies inherited from
medieval times. In the United States, democracy and equality have been
even more closely linked in that the goal of achieving social and political
equality has for many groups been intimately bound up with efforts to gain
the vote.23 The franchise has long been understood here as a kind of "certificate of full membership in society," 4 ratifying its holder's status as a
full-fledged citizen of the American republic. Expansion of the franchise
has thus been associated at least as much with achieving a kind of social
equality of status as it has been with perfecting liberal democratic notions
of indirect popular sovereignty over governmental agents.
22 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 98 (First Collier Books ed., 1962) (1651) ("[Nlature hath
made men so equal, in the faculties of the body, and mind; as that... when all is reckoned together, the
difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he."); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1690) (describing the state of nature as "a state of ...equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same
species and rank . . . should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection")
(emphasis omitted); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating "that all men
are created equal").
23

See

ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY

IN THE UNITED STATES

(2000);

JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:

CLUSION 60-61 (1991).
24 SHKLAR, supra note 23, at 27.

THE QUEST FOR IN-

2003]

THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY

1473

Nevertheless, although democracy and egalitarianism share a history,
they are by no means identical. Although radical egalitarianism has been
defined in various ways,25 in the political setting we may say, following
Dahl, that egalitarianism becomes radical when it takes as its point of departure the idea of universal political competence. According to this idea,
"all the members of the association are adequately qualified to participate
on an equal footing with the others in the process of governing the association."26 Radical egalitarianism is plainly inconsistent with the dominant
republicanism of the founding generation, which conceived of society as
divided into political classes consisting of those competent to rule, those
competent only to select their rulers, and those not competent to participate
in politics at all.27 Nevertheless, republicanism was almost immediately
abandoned by Americans in favor of a populist egalitarianism which held
that political competence was far more widely dispersed than the founders
had been inclined to believe.28 This belief was in time formally institutionalized, first through the establishment of universal white manhood suffrage, and then through the extension of the franchise to blacks, women,
and eighteen-year-olds, to the point where today Americans enjoy virtually
25 Robert Bork, for example, defines it as equality of outcomes. ROBERT

H. BORK, SLOUCHING

TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 5 (1996), According to Hugo
A. Bedau, it is "the doctrine which asserts ... [a]ll social inequalities are unnecessary, and unjustifiable, and ought to be eliminated." HUGO A. BEDAU, Radical Egalitarianism, in JUSTICE AND
EQUALITY 168 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1971).
26 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 31 (1989).
27 At the top of this food chain were the great men of the realm, so to speak, the members of Jefferson's "natural aristocracy." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE
LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 632 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1972). These were the Madisonian "fit characters" whose "wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In the
middle were those solid and basically competent citizens who were "unqualified for the management of
affairs requiring intelligence above the common level, yet competent judges of human character," and
thus qualified to "chuse ... representatives." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Du Pont de Nemours
(Apr. 24, 1816), in THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JEFFERSON AND DU PONT DE NEMOURS 257 (Gilbert
Chinard ed., 1931) [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE OF JEFFERSON]. At the bottom were those incompetent to participate in politics because they lacked an independent will of their own. This group included men who owned no property, which made them unduly dependent on and subservient toward
their employers, and women, who were dependent on and subservient to their husbands. KEYSSAR,
supra note 23, at 5-6; Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41
STAN. L. REv. 335, 337-39 (1989).
28 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 234-35 (1992)

(stating that "Americans came to believe that no one in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out
manner was really better than anyone else"); HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS

OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 5 (1990) (noting that by the Jacksonian period, Americans publicly professed "a strident egalitarianism").

1474
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suffrage.29

universal
The principle of radical egalitarianism has thus become firmly embedded in American political and constitutional traditions.
Things stand very differently with radical democracy. As I shall use
the term here, democracy becomes radical when it proceeds from the idea

that popular sovereignty should apply without limitation across all or
nearly all domains of government activity. Radical democracy thus embraces two premises: popular control-which is to say, majoritarian control-over political outcomes should be (1) universal, and (2) complete-

which is to say unconstrained except by the wishes of the majority itself.
Like radical egalitarianism, radical democracy rests at bottom on a con-

ception of individual political competence, but of a much more thoroughgoing variety. In radical democracy, public competence is understood to

be sufficient to permit universal, unmediated democratic rule because the
people not only are fully capable of performing every task that selfgovernance might demand of them,30 but are also incapable of misusing
their powers of self-rule. Radical democracy thus postulates a kind of inherent, Rousseauvian popular virtue that disables the people from using
their competence and powers in any way other than justly and for the
common good. 3
Unlike radical egalitarianism, radical democracy clearly is antithetical
to American political and constitutional traditions. The Constitution's institutions of representative government were originally created in the belief
29 Among adult citizens, the most common remaining grounds for disqualification from voting
are conviction of a felony and mental incompetence. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 2 (felony conviction); CAL. CONST. art. I1,
§ 4 (mental incompetence).
30 This is a highly dubious assumption. As Plato observed long ago, navigating a ship at sea is
not a function that ought to be submitted to the democratic control of the sailors. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 195-96 (Francis MacDonald Comford ed., 1945). Or as Dahl less metaphorically
puts it: "[a]t least some . . ; [public policy] judgments require specialized knowledge of a sort we cannot reasonably expect most people to possess." DAHL, supra note 26, at 69. Interestingly, the Jacksonians took the position that no function performed by government was beyond the capacity of an ordinary person. As Jackson himself put it, "the duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being
made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance." First Annual Message, December 8, 1829, reprinted in ANDREW JACKSON 1767-1845, at 23, 25
(Ronald E. Shaw ed., 1969). Populists like William Jennings Bryan later argued similarly that "the
people were competent 'to sit in judgment on very question which has arisen or which will arise, no
matter how long our government will endure'...." RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:
FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 260 (1955). These sentiments might been more true in Jackson's and Bryant's
days than today.
Rousseau argued, somewhat obscurely, that the common good could be unerringly
perceived
by the popular general will, and that the general will was best perceived by a majority of the populace.
James A. Gardner, Madison 's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86
IOWA L. REv. 87, 140-41 (2000). A surprisingly similar idea prevailed in some quarters during the
Revolutionary period: "In the Whig conception of politics a tyranny by the people was theoretically
inconceivable .... GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
62 (1969).
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that "[t]he people ... should have as little to do as may be about the Gov32
ernment. They want information, and are constantly liable to be misled."
In consequence, the defining feature of the Constitution, according to
Madison, was its "total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity." 3 Although the domain of popular control has increased somewhat
due to constitutional amendment and evolving practice,3 4 Madison's description is still apt: the national Constitution contains no mechanism of
direct popular self-rule. Even on the state level, where some states now
permit direct popular lawmaking through the initiative and referendum,
direct democracy is tolerated more than embraced. Even the most zealous
defenders of the initiative process have never justified it on the ground that
direct popular legislation is an intrinsically superior way to make law.
They claim only that it is sometimes better than the altemative-a process
of representation perverted from time to time by legislative incompetence
or corruption.35
Radical democracy's presumptions of innate popular virtue and selfrestraint lie even further outside the main currents of American political
and constitutional tradition. That democratic majorities lack self-restraint
32 Comments of Roger Sherman (May 31, 1787), in JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES INTHE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39 (Bicentennial ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840) [hereinafter
MADISON'S NOTES].
33THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
34 The Seventeenth Amendment established direct election of Senators. U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII. The Electoral College never worked as the Framers intended, as a deliberative body of wise,
virtuous, and independent electors. Instead, it has been transformed informally into an approximation
of direct popular election. As Justice Jackson once observed: "This arrangement miscarried. Electors,
although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially become voluntary party
lackeys and intellectual nonentities ....As an institution the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost
indistinguishable from rigormortis." Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
35 As Woodrow Wilson, a leading Progressive, put it:
It must be remembered that we are contrasting the operation of the initiative and referendum, not with the representative government which we possess in theory and
which we have long persuaded ourselves that we possessed in fact, but with the actual state of affairs, with legislative processes which are carried on in secret, responding to the impulse of subsidized machines and carried through by men whose
unhappiness it is to realize that they are not their own masters, but puppets in a
game.
Woodrow Wilson, Issues of Reform, quoted in THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 54 (1989). Cronin concludes that "direct democracy devices were a means of temporarily bypassing .. .legislatures and enacting needed laws on
behalf of the downtrodden farmer, debtor, or laborer." Id. at 45. A more recent study confirms these
sentiments, concluding on the basis of survey data that what most citizens want is not greater direct
control over political decision making, but rather a process of political decision making "which renders
it impossible for decision makers to act on the basis of selfish motivations." JOHN R. HIBBING &
ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT
SHOULD WoRK 86 (2002). "People appear to want to be more active and involved in politics," the
authors continue, "only because it is one of the few ways they can see ... of stopping decisions from
being made by those who directly benefit from those decisions." Id. at 131.

was axiomatic for the

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
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built into the Constitu-

tion every conceivable device to disable popular majorities from obtaining
their way. The very notion of judicially enforceable individual rights presupposes the possibility of a majority determined to enact its desires into
policy at the expense of a vulnerable minority. Nor has the recent advent
of limited direct democracy made any significant inroads into this traditional American way of thinking. Not only are initiatives and referenda

often subordinate to constitutional protection for individual rights,37 but
many other subjects deemed too sensitive for direct popular decision making often are withdrawn from the scope of the popular lawmaking power.3"
B. The FourteenthAmendment Regime of RadicalEgalitarianism

Beginning with its 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,39 in which it an-

nounced its intention to enter the "political thicket,"4' the Supreme Court
spent the better part of two decades employing the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to work a revolution in the constitutional
structure of American politics. This revolution grew out of, and was
36 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (setting out

theory of tendency of human to engage in factional, i.e., self-interested, behavior).
7For example, the Massachusetts Constitution
provides:
No proposition inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the individual, as
at present declared in the declaration of rights, shall be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition: The right to receive compensation for private property appropriated to public use; the right of access to and protection in courts of justice; the
right of trial by jury; protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail and the
law martial; freedom of the press; freedom of speech; freedom of elections; and the
right of peaceable assembly.
MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII, pt. I!,
§ 2. More comprehensively, the Michigan Constitution provides:
"The power of initiative extends only to laws which the legislature may enact under this constitution."
MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. In some jurisdictions, courts draw a functionally similar distinction between
constitutional "amendment" and "revision", holding the latter to be beyond the popular power to enact
initiatives. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088-89 (Cal. 1990) (invalidating as a "revision"
an initiative provision that would have required numerous rights granted to criminal defendants under
the state constitution to be given the same interpretation by state courts as their federal counterparts are
given by the U.S. Supreme Court).
38 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. amend. XLVIII, pt. I1,
§ 2 (excluding from initiative power authority
to enact measures relating to "religion, religious practices or religious institutions; or to the appointment, qualification, tenure, removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the reversal of a judicial
decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of courts; or the operation of which is restricted to a
particular town, city or other political division ....
");MICH. CONST. art. Ii, § 9 ("The power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in
state funds ....
");
NEv. CONST. art. 19, § 6 ("This article does not permit the proposal of any statute or
statutory amendment which makes an appropriation or otherwise requires the expenditure of money,
unless such statute or amendment also imposes a sufficient tax, not prohibited by the constitution, or
otherwise constitutionally provides for raising the necessary revenue.").
39369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40 The phrase is Justice Frankfurter's, from his subsequently disregarded opinion for
the Court in
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), explaining why apportionment issues should be considered nonjusticiable.
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guided by, principles of radical egalitarianism first worked out in the nineteenth century, and in a sense completed the expansion of suffrage begun
during the Jacksonian period. The Court's equal protection rulings from
the 1960s and 1970s rest firmly on the notion that all citizens are competent to participate in whatever democratic politics a state may choose to
establish. These decisions open up political processes and deal with who
may participate in state politics-but not how they may participate.
This trend is most easily recognized in a string of decisions invalidating exclusions from the franchise. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,4' Carrington v. Rash,42 and Dunn v. Blumstein,"3 for example, the
Court struck down voter disqualifications based on failure to pay a poll
tax,44 reliance on U.S. military service within the state to establish nonresidency,45 and failure to reside in the state for one year.46 In each case, the
Court rejected the state's contention that the challenged voting prerequisite
accurately measured any kind of constitutionally relevant competence to
participate in local politics through voting.47
A paradigmatic decision of this type is Kramer v. Union Free School
4 8 in which the Court invalidated a state law limiting voting in local
District,
school board elections to homeowners and renters-those who paid property taxes levied by school boards-and parents of school-age children. 9
This limitation, according to the state, restricted the franchise to those with
a direct stake in the outcome of school board elections, and in so doing to
those with the competence necessary to participate indirectly in the process
of school policy formation. As the state put it, "the ever increasing complexity of the many interacting phases of the school system and structure
make it extremely difficult for the electorate fully to understand the whys
and wherefores of the detailed operations of the school system."50 In the
state's view, only parents, who received a steady flow of information directly from the schools, and property taxpayers, who had a strong incentive
to inform themselves, were competent to govern intelligently.5 The Court
rejected these arguments and struck down the exclusion, agreeing with the
41 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

42 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
43 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
44 Harper,383 U.S. at 666.
45 Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96.
46 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 332-33.
47

1n his dissent in Harper, Justice Harlan criticized the Court for reading the Equal Protection
Clause to "rigidly impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism." Harper, 383 U.S.

at 686.

48 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
49 Id.at 622.
5

od.at 63 1.
51Id.
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plaintiff that all members of the community had a constitutionally sufficient interest in its governmental affairs to entitle them to participate
through voting.52
Even cases from this period that do not deal with complete exclusion
from the franchise nevertheless display a radically egalitarian interest in the
equal status of citizens. For example, in Wesberry v. Sanders,53 Reynolds
v. Sims, 54 and Avery v. Midland County," the Court invalidated population
inequalities in election districts drawn for the purpose of electing members
of Congress, state legislatures, and local government bodies, respectively;
and imposed for all levels of government a regime of equally weighted
voting-the requirement of one-person, one-vote. In reaching these results, the Court analogized votes cast from malapportioned districts to outright exclusion: "the right of suffrage," the Court said in Reynolds, "can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."56
Like exclusion from politics through denial of the franchise, then, an unequally weighted vote does not do justice to the basic political equality and
competence of citizens.
What also makes these cases so clearly examples of the application of
a principle of radical egalitarianism is that the Court throughout this period
took great pains simultaneously to establish that the political equality demanded by the Equal Protection Clause extends only to democratic processes actually created by the state. The Clause, that is, does not entitle any
person, group or polity to a form or degree of democratic popular control
beyond whatever the state chooses to provide. As the Court put it, the right
conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment is the right merely to "participate
in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters."" Where other
qualified voters have no right to participate, even universal exclusion does
not offend the Clause. For example, in Fortson v. Morris,58 the Court rejected a challenge to a section of the Georgia Constitution providing for
selection of the Governor by the state legislature if no candidate obtained a
majority of the popular vote.59 The Court has also sustained state laws
52 Id. at 633.

53376 U.S. 1,4 (1964).
54377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
55390 U.S. 474, 475-76 (1968).
56 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
57 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980); see also Hadley v. Junior Coll.
Dist., 397

U.S. 50, 55 (1970) (noting that voters have right "to participate on an equal footing in the election
process"); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (stating that "once the franchise is
granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
58385 U.S. 231 (1966).
59 Id. at 232-33.
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providing that vacancies in popularly elective offices be filled by appointment rather than by election," and requiring multidistrict school boards to
be elected by their constituent school boards even where the constituent
school boards were themselves popularly elected.61 In all these cases, then,
the Constitution of radical egalitarianism guarantees not democracy itself,
but equality of access to extant democratic processes.
C. The Shift Toward Radical Democracy
1. The FirstAmendment Empire of Radical Democracy
The Court's decisions concerning the regulation of politics began to

take a different direction in its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo.62 Buckley involved a constitutional challenge to campaign finance restrictions
contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA").63 The challenged provisions restricted political contributions and capped expenditures
by and on behalf of candidates, among other things.' Understandably in
view of the nature of the Court's electoral jurisprudence up until that point,
the law's defenders attempted to justify the challenged restrictions on
grounds that were radically egalitarian. The limitations, they claimed,
were necessary to level the political playing field; those who possessed
more resources were able to command greater attention, which gave them
greater influence for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the
political views they espoused.65 In this sense, unequal opportunities for
political spending were analogous to the unequally weighted voting condemned in Reynolds; both unfairly allocated access to political power.66
60 Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 3 (1982); Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F.
Supp. 851, 853-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afftd, 393 U.S. 405 (1969) (per curiam).
61Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 106-08 (1967).
62 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
63 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6.
64 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12-13.
65 For example, in the main brief the Attorney General and Federal Election Commission argued
that the objectives of FECA included "to democratize elections by diminishing the power of wealthy
interests and encouraging wider citizen participation." Brief for Appellees General and Federal Election Comm'n at 18, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437). The congressional
purpose, they went on, was "to lessen the disproportionate advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy
special interest groups, and to increase opportunities for meaningful participation by ordinary citizens..
•." Id. at 23. Other litigants were even more direct. The Center for Public Financing of Elections
argued that the high cost of campaigning has tended to "[cIlose [p]olitics" to those who lack wealth,
and "has become a barrier to the candidacies of persons who lack great wealth or access to it." Brief
for Appellees Center for Public Financing of Elections et al., at 67, 73, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I
(1976) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437).
66 See, e.g., Brief for Appellees Attorney General and Federal Election Comm'n, supra note 65,
at 24 (stating that "[e]nlarging the opportunities of the many diminishes the prerogatives of the few.
But, in a constitutional system involving the egalitarian principles of 'one person, one vote' that is no

1480

CONNECTICUT LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 35:1467

In an opinion analyzing the restrictions primarily under the First

Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause, the Court rejected this
reasoning.67 Treating the spending of money in political campaigns as the
equivalent of political speech itself, the Court ruled that legislatures may
not equalize political expenditures so as to "restrict the speech of some" for
the purpose of "enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others." '8 The Court consequently invalidated all the expenditure limitations, thereby constitutionalizing a regime of unrestricted and unrestrictable political speech.69 It
upheld FECA's ceilings on financial contributions to candidates, but again
not because such limitations might have had any tendency to equalize candidates' ability to attract resources. 70 These provisions survived only on
the theory that contributions may be regulated because of their potential for
use as bribes.7'
The Court's reasoning in Buckley marked a profound shift in its approach to laws regulating the political process. In declining to treat FECA
as a law equalizing access to politics, the Court instead chose to view it as
a law regulating the political behavior of those already in politics.72 Those
who lack the money to buy speech, the Court reasoned, are not thereby
excluded from politics; they are simply political actors with few
resources. 7' FECA, as the Court saw it, was thus a regulation of the be-

havior of those already deeply engaged in politics, a law that essentially
commanded some political actors to stop talking politics before they were
good and ready to stop. 74 By itself, this shift in viewpoint is not very sig-

nificant. The real significance of Buckley lies in the Court's adoption of an
objection, so long as no one is excluded from participation.") (internal citations omitted). The brief
went on to argue that FECA was designed "to redress gross imbalance" whereby "large contributors
may be able to monopolize or grossly distort the political process." Id. at 25. Contemporary critics of
Buckley frequently make similar arguments. See, e.g., Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection
and the Wealth Primary,11 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 273, 274 (1993) (stating that "[tloday, the principal

question of democratic legitimacy facing our society is whether the extraordinary power of private
wealth to shape the nature and outcome of public elections is consistent with the constitutional command of one person/one vote"); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and
PracticalSuperiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1165 (1994)

(stating that "[t]he key First Amendment issue at stake... is not the right of the wealthy to spend up to
the heavens, but the right of all citizens, poor and wealthy alike, to speak and participate meaningfully
in the electoral process").
67 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
68 Id.

69 Id. at 143.
70 Id. at 23-29.
Id.
72Id.at 17-21,31-38,94.

73Id. at 20-21
74 Id. at 45-5 1.
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extremely bellicose stand against regulatory measures designed, in its
view, to shape or reform the character of political participation." Under
the Buckley approach, once they are admitted to the realm of politics, political actors must be free to decide for themselves how to behave there,
subject only to narrow constraints on behavior so egregious that it threatens
to subvert democratic self-government entirely, such as outright bribery
and influence-peddling. Buckley, then, is a case in which the Court's pursuit of radical egalitarianism elided subtly into a very different enterprise:
the invocation and enforcement of a constitutional agenda of radical democracy.
The Court's growing commitment to a First Amendment regime of
radical democracy can be seen in many decisions since Buckley. For example, in a long series of cases dealing with state regulation of political
parties, the Court has used the First Amendment right of association to
establish a general rule that political parties can do pretty much what they
like, free from behavior-modifying state regulation.76 The only significant
exceptions appear to be where the state regulates to prevent racial discrimination and to control access to the official ballot.77
The First Amendment regime of radical democracy has shown up perhaps most vividly, however, in the Court's recent attack, in Republican
Party v. White,78 on the venerable political model of nonpartisanship.
White concerned a Minnesota canon of judicial conduct that prohibited
elected state judges from campaigning for office on the basis of their substantive political views.79 Instead, candidates could campaign for judicial
office solely on their "character," "education," "work habits," and views on
judicial administration. 0 The idea that public officials should be selected
on the basis of their character and fitness for office rather than their political opinions is an old one in American political thought. The Framers believed that ordinary voters typically were incapable of meaningfully as75Id.at 137-44.
76 E.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575-56, 586 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216, 222-25, 229-31 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican
Party, 479 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1986); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 120-24 (1981).
77E.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782-88. 806 (1983); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S.

134, 135, 149 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38-40 (1968); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
462, 468-70 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 651,664-666 (1944); see also Nathaniel Persily,

Toward a FunctionalDefense ofPoliticalParty Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750, 752 (2001) (noting
that the Supreme Court "has been quite aggressive in protecting parties' rights to define their primary
electorate so long as the party is not seeking the freedom to discriminate on the basis of race, or the
party is not a minor party whose rights are viewed as disruptive to the electoral or governmental process").
78 122 S.Ct. 2528 (2002).
Id. at 2531.
s0 /d. at 2534.
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sessing the merits of competing public policy options, and that to campaign
based on promises to implement a particular political agenda consequently

amounted to a kind of demagoguery."' In contrast, as good republicans, the
Framers thought the people very well suited indeed to judge candidates on
the basis of their character, and thus to choose the best qualified candidate
for elevation to public office.82
This idea was later revived by the Progressives in the form of nonpartisan elections. Progressives conceived of government as an enterprise of
public management, subject largely to discoverable scientific laws and best
left to impartial, expert administrators,83 a view occasionally summed up in
the maxim that "[t]here is no Democratic or Republican way of cleaning
the streets."84 Partisanship has no legitimate place in politics according to
this view; public officials are obliged to be impartial seekers of the common good rather than partisan adherents of the views of their organized
supporters. The Progressive notion of politics enjoyed widespread acceptance in the early twentieth century, and is responsible for the fact that
nonpartisanship remains the dominant model of local government politics

throughout the nation. 5
Progressive thought was highly influential in early twentieth-century
reform of judicial elections, 6 and shows up in a generalized preference for
nonpartisan judicial campaigns. In these campaigns, the only issue before
the voters is, by design, the candidates' capacity for fair, competent judging, rather than their inclinations to decide cases in any particular way on
the merits. Such a preference can be found in the most common model of
81Consistent with republican assumptions, the first six presidents did not actively campaign for
office, an activity which they believed would in itself demonstrate their unfitness for office. RALPH
KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-1829, at 89-140
(19842.
"[Tihe mass of individuals composing the society,
.. .being unqualified for the management
of affairs requiring intelligence above the common level, yet competent judges of human character,
they chuse for their management representatives ..." CORRESPONDENCE OF JEFFERSON, supra note 27,
at 256-57; see also BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, I THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. II, at 9-10 (Thomas
Nugent trans., rev. ed., The Colonial Press 1899) (stating that "[t]he people are extremely well qualified
for choosing those whom they are to intrust with part of their authority .... But are they capable of
conducting an intricate affair, of seizing and improving the opportunity and critical moment of action?
No; this surpasses their abilities").
83 See SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920, at 102-03 (1964); HOFSTADTER, supra note 30, at 101.
84 CHARLES GARRETr, THE LA GUARDIA YEARS, MACHINE AND REFORM POLITICS IN NEW
YORK CITY 274 (1961). Although this precise formulation is attributed to New York City's reformist
mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, it and similar phrases apparently were common slogans of Progressive
municial reform.
CAROL A. CASSEL, The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS
AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES 226 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986).
86 Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689, 714-25 (1995); Edward Hartnett, Why Is the Supreme Court of the United States
Protecting State Judgesfrom Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1997).
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an elective judiciary, the "Missouri Plan" of nonpartisan retention elec,tions; 7 in more explicit provisions, such as the Utah Constitution's directive that "[s]election of judges shall be based solely upon consideration of
fitness for office without regard to any partisan political considerations"; 8
and in rules severely restricting the content of judicial campaigning such as
the Minnesota judicial canon at issue in White. 9
In White, the Court invoked the First Amendment to invalidate Minnesota's regulatory restrictions on the grounds upon which candidates may
campaign for judicial office." ° Dismissing the possibility that the restrictions might serve any kind of coherent conception of politics, the Court
concluded that "the First Amendment does not permit [the state] to achieve
its goal by leaving the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing what the election is about."9' But precisely what is
an election "about"? Into this loaded phrase the Court smuggled a vast,
unexplained, and unjustified assumption that elections are necessarily
"about" providing the electorate with the opportunity to choose candidates
on the basis of their commitment to policies preferred by the voters themselves.92 As Justice Kennedy put it in his concurrence, "[t]he State cannot
opt for an elected judiciary and then assert that its democracy, in order to
work as desired, compels the abridgment of speech." 9a Yet that is precisely
what the state asserts, because "its" democracy-unlike the democracy
conceived by the majority and by Justice Kennedy-rests on a different
model of politics. In Minnesota's model of judicial politics, voters simply
do not perform the radically democratic function of selecting judges based
upon whatever considerations they may happen to think relevant. Instead,
the people of the state have collectively decided upon a different and more
limited popular role, one in which the people are deemed competent to
assess judicial candidates only on the basis of their integrity and experience; the merits of judicial policy are ruled out of bounds by popular
agreement.
The Court's ruling in White makes clear that states are constitutionally
disabled under the First Amendment from adopting, even on an experimental basis, any model of politics other than radical democracy. Indeed,
the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia,94 seems to take a kind of
mean-spirited pleasure in suppressing what it seems to view as the naively
87 For an account of the Missouri Plan, see Croley, supra note 86, at 724-26.
88 UTAH CONST. art. Vill, § 8.

Republican Party v. White, i22 S.Ct. 2528, 2531 (2002).
9 Id. at 2542.
91 Id. at 2541 (emphasis added).
89

92

Id.
93 Id. at 2545.
94 Id. at 2531.
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misguided notion that politics could possibly be understood as an arena in
which anything other than raw, unconstrained, majoritarian power might
ever be an appropriate organizing principle. That the Constitution might
tolerate such a notion of politics seems, to the Court, too ridiculous to
contemplate.
2. The Empire Expands: The Lawless Legislature
Up to this point, the Court's handling of radical egalitarianism and
radical democracy might at least be explained, if not justified, as the result
of a constitutionally embedded tension between the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause and the First Amendment. Examination of some other
recent decisions, however, shows that things are not nearly that simple. In
fact, the Court's jurisprudential embrace of radical democracy has seeped
back into its equal protection rulings and spread, astonishingly, to its decisions interpreting the Constitution's structural provisions. Here, though,
the Court's concern has been less with limitations on the political behavior
of individuals than with limitations on the political behavior of legislatures.
In a number of rulings dealing with state legislative oversight of redistricting and federal elections, the Court has moved toward a position suggesting that state legislative oversight of the political process must be lawless.
Such oversight, in other words, must proceed directly from majoritarian
political forces, unconstrained by constitutional forms of collective selfrestraint. The Constitution, on this view, expresses a preference for rules
regulating the political process that are forged in politics, by those already
in the game, over rules forged outside of politics, and crafted for the purpose of constraining the subsequent behavior in politics of political actors.
In the earlier cases, the Court's position is relatively inchoate, revealing itself more in descriptions of legislative behavior of which the Constitution approves than in identification of limitations on such behavior which
it condemns. For example, in its equal protection cases concerning redistricting, the Court has often held that the legislative practice of drawing
district lines so as to assure the reelection of incumbents is a constitutionally unobjectionable goal. 95 Although the Court has said that partisan gerrymandering might in some circumstances violate the Equal Protection
Clause,96 the standard it has articulated is so weak that no partisan gerrymander has ever been invalidated. Indeed, in Gaffney v. Cummings, the
Court went so far as to hold constitutionally inoffensive a bipartisan legislative power-sharing agreement to gerrymander the state in a way that pre(1983

95 E.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S.
109,141,143 (1986).
97412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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served the agreed-upon relative strength of the two major parties.9 8
None of these cases actually enforces a federal constitutional regime of
state legislative lawlessness because none forecloses the possibility that
state constitutional constraints on districting practices might nevertheless
bind the state legislature. Thus, state constitutional districting requirements of contiguity, compactness, or socio-economic uniformity,99 for example, might still lawfully constrain legislative politics, as would a decision to remove the redistricting process from the legislature entirely and
turn it over to a purportedly neutral board or commission."
The Court took a stronger step in the direction of legislative lawlessness when it began issuing a series of rulings invalidating under the Equal
Protection Clause the drawing of district lines on the ground that the legislature had given excessive consideration to the racial composition of the
district's populace. In cases such as Shaw v. Reno,"0 ' Miller v. Johnson,"°2
Shaw v. Hunt,'0 3 and Bush v. Vera,'0 4 the Court struck down districting
plans drawn for the purpose of complying with Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act ("VRA"),0 5 a federal civil rights law forbidding infringement
of the right to vote on account of race. In each of these cases, a state legislature's attempt to comply with the VRA led it to draw more black- or
Latino-controlled districts than it might have been inclined to draw if left to
indulge its own political preferences.
In its rulings, the Court has carefully described the constitutional offense as making race the "predominant" consideration in drawing district
lines.0 6 Yet it is clear in these cases that the principal reason the legislatures gave such prominent consideration to race was to comply with the
VRA.'0 7 The Court has been careful to avoid saying openly that Section 2
98 Id. at 736-740, 754.
99See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(c) (districts to be contiguous); COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 47
cl. 3 (districts to encompass an integrated socio-economic area); ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (districts to

be compact).

See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2A; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (creating independent board or
commission to perform state legislative redistricting). As discussed below, the Court's impending
decision in Branch v. Smith will decide whether a state constitution can require congressional redistrictin to be performed by a redistricting board over the legislature's objection.
01 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
102 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
103 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
104 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
105 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
106 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257-8 (2001); Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-17.
107 This has been especially obvious in cases such as Shaw and Miller, where the state's initial
redistricting plan has been denied preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by the U.S.
Department of Justice. On the other hand, one might also say that the entire enterprise of seeking a
predominant motivation for a redistricting plan is misguided. See Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2546 (1997).
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of the VRA is unconstitutional because it leads legislatures to pay too
much attention to racial considerations. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
avoid the impression that what most bothers the Court in these cases is the
presence of an externally imposed legal limitation on the otherwise unconstrained legislative politics of redistricting, a limitation that aims to produce within the legislature a different and more racially balanced politics
than the one legislators would on their own be inclined to create.
Even these cases, however, can be explained on other grounds, namely
the Court's developing preference for an across-the-board equal protection
jurisprudence of color-blindness.'
Nevertheless, the Court took a major
and much more explicit step in the direction of enforcing a norm of radical
legislative democracy in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,'0 9
a case arising out of the botched 2000 presidential election process in
Florida. An initial count of the ballots had shown George Bush leading Al
Gore by fewer than 1,800 votes out of nearly six million cast, a result requiring a recount under Florida law."0 After a preliminary partial recount
indicated a need for a more thorough manual recount, a conflict arose between the Secretary of State and several county election officials regarding
the statutory deadline by which counties conducting manual recounts had
to certify their results."' The Florida Supreme Court resolved this conflict
in favor of the counties, and thus in favor of continuing the recount process, by construing two apparently conflicting provisions of the state election code."' In harmonizing these provisions, the court looked frequently
to the Florida Constitution for guidance, which it construed to require it to
read the disputed statutes so as best to effectuate the right to vote of the
state's voters. 13
Bush then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In an inconclusive
ruling, the Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court for clarification as to the actual basis of its decision.' 4 However, the specific reason the Court remanded the case was to find out "the extent to which the
Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the
legislature's authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2 [of the U.S. Constitution]."" 5
This section provides that presidential electors from each state shall be
selected "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.""' 6 Al108 See

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
109 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
110 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000).
III Id. at 1225-26.
121d. at 1237.
113 Id. at 1227-28, 1230, 1236-37.
114 Bush, 531 U.S. at 78.
11 Id.
116 U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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though it did not specifically so hold, the Court's opinion suggests strongly
that it read this language to mean, literally, that the legislature-and only
the legislature-may decide how presidential electors may be selected.
State courts and constitutions, not being "legislatures," may play no role in
such decisions. As a result, the Court implied, state legislatures are free to
regulate presidential elections however they see fit, unconstrained by any
limitations otherwise imposed by state constitutions or by state courts trying to enforce them." 7 The legislature, in other words, must act without
constraint by superior state law.
In a case to be decided this term, the Court will have an opportunity to
clarify and perhaps to extend its reasoning in the Bush case. In Smith v.
Clark,"8 a federal District Court entertained a similar question arising from
the language of Article I, § 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides:
"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof...
', The case arose out of the failure of the Mississippi Legislature to produce a valid congressional redistricting plan in time for the 2002
elections. 2 ° Mississippi voters brought suit in the Mississippi Chancery
Court, petitioning the court to redraw the districts in view of the legislature's failure to do so.' 2' After its jurisdiction was upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Chancery Court adopted a redistricting plan.'
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs in a parallel action pending in U.S. District Court
asked that court to enjoin implementation of the state court's plan on the
ground that redistricting is a regulation of the time, place and manner of
elections, and that only the state legislature may undertake such regulation
under Article I, § 4.123 Finding no express legislative delegation of the
redistricting power to the state's trial courts, the federal court agreed and
invalidated the state court's plan.' 24
If this ruling is affirmed,'25 it will create yet another arena of legislative
supremacy in which state legislatures are free to establish political ground
117

For a fuller discussion, see James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role of State Constitutional

StructuralConstraints in Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625 (2001). For a more sympathetic account, see Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct":
The Outcome of Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (2001).
118 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (3-judge court), cert. granted sub nom Smith
v.
Branch, 12 S.Ct. 2355 (2002).
119 U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 4 (emphasis added).
120Smith, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
121 Id.
122Id. at 505-06.
123Id. at 506.
124Id. at 556-58.

125As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion in Branch in
which it declined to reach the Article 1,§ 4 issue. Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003).
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rules through ordinary political processes, and are consequently incapable
of being restrained by state legal or constitutional limits in the performance
of their function of regulating federal elections. As will be developed further below, the idea that any court could place such an interpretation on
any of the U.S. Constitution's structuralprovisions is ironic to the point of
absurdity.

II. THE CASE AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL RADICAL DEMOCRACY
In view of well-established principles and traditions of American constitutionalism, even to point out a jurisprudential drift toward reading a
regime of radical democracy into the U.S. Constitution is perhaps to argue
against it. One might say that there is no place in the American constitutional tradition for radical democracy, and that is true enough, but it hardly
begins to capture the strangeness of the Court's direction. The problem
runs much deeper: radical democracy is in every way antithetical to the
principles for which the U.S. Constitution stands; it is, in fact, the form of
government against which the major features of the U.S. Constitution were
meant to stand. Radical democracy is, in the American constitutional tradition, a kind of anti-Constitution. To construe the U.S. Constitution to
embody a regime of radical democracy is thus not just mistaken, but perverse. Specifically, the regime of radical democracy laid out in the Supreme Court decisions discussed in the previous section is wrong-headed
for at least three reasons: it is deeply ahistorical, conceptually incoherent,
and ultimately dangerous to democratic self-government itself.
A. The HistoricalRejection of Radical Democracy
In the United States, radical democracy received a brief trial following
independence in 1776. It was soon viewed as a failure, and within a few
years had been widely rejected as a workable model for structuring state
governments. By 1787, when the Philadelphia Convention met to draft a
new national governing document, radical democracy had been so far discredited among the delegates that it often served as a model of what a good
constitutional plan should strive to avoid.
The most serious and sustained experiment with large-scale radical
democracy in the United States was the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.
Deeply influenced by the 1776 publication in Philadelphia of Tom Paine's
Common Sense, 26 Pennsylvania's constitutional drafters created a frame of
government that closely approached Paine's ideal of a radical republic in
which the will of a popular majority would be translated into official policy
126Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions ofthe Founding Decade: Pennsylvania 'sRadical

1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 541, 551-55
(1989).
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as directly as the mechanism of representation would permit, free from
interference and obstruction by organs of government representing aristocratic or monarchical elements.'
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Constitution established a unicameral legislature, 2 ' elected annually' 29 by an
electorate consisting of all "freemen" who had "paid public taxes" during
the preceding year. 0
The power of the legislature was, by contemporary American standards, virtually unchecked. Executive power was vested in a weak, twelveperson elected council that lacked any authority to influence the content of
legislation.' 3' Although the constitution contained a bill of rights which
was explicitly stated to be "a part of the constitution,"'3 it did not provide
for any independent governmental review of the constitutionality of legislative measures. Instead, a septennially-elected Council of Censors was
authorized to "enquire whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate in every part,"'3 but upon finding a violation was limited to recommending repeal of questionable legislation or calling a convention to
amend the constitution.134
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 stated plainly that its goal was
to "make the voice of a majority of the people the law of the land. 1 3' To
its critics, it had instead created a "mobocracy. ,136 The Pennsylvania system of unchecked majoritarianism, intended to protect liberty by removing
obstructions separating the people from governance, instead soon was understood to have effectuated a different kind of tyranny. As Madison reported, the Pennsylvania Council of Censors, meeting in 1783 and 1784,
determined that "the Constitution had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of important instances."' 37 These included violation of
rules requiring publicity of legislative actions, invasion of the constitution127 The notion that a chief executive and a senate or other upper legislative chamber embody or
represent, respectively, monarchical and aristocratic interests derives from the ancient ideal of the
"mixed" constitution. See generally M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 37-56 (2d ed. 1998).
128 PA. CONST. § 2 (1776).
129 Id. § 9.
0
13
Id.§ 6.
131Id. § 19.
132 Id. § 46.
d.§ 47.
d33
134
Id.
Id.§ 17. The Council of Censors met in 1783 and 1784. THE FEDERALIST No. 50, at 318
I35
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison noted that in at least one instance where the
Council accused the legislature of violating the constitution, the legislature "denied the constructions of
the council and actually prevailed in the contest." Id. at 320.
136 Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Jan. 22, 1789), quoted in Williams, supra note
126, at 559.
137 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 312 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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ally protected trial by jury, assumption of legislative powers constitutionally denied, and usurpation of powers allocated to the executive branch.'
Only two states, Vermont and Georgia, followed Pennsylvania's lead
when drafting their own constitutions in the 1770s.' 39 The rest considered
it a poor example, and set out to construct governments in which power
was far more widely dispersed and checked than in the Pennsylvania
model. 40 By the early 1780s, an even stronger consensus had developed
against the Pennsylvania model and in favor of a far more attenuated kind
of popular control.' 4 ' By the time the Philadelphia Convention met in
1787, Pennsylvania's brand of radical democracy served as a point of reference against which the delegates frequently reacted. 42 The Pennsylvania
Constitution was widely seen as an extreme example of the excessively
democratic structures of state constitutions, which made them "unable to
provide checks against wide-ranging assaults on liberty and property by the
relatively unfettered states legislatures."' 143 The delegates thus spoke of an
"excess of democracy,'' 144 or of the "danger aris[ing] from the democratic
parts of our [state] constitutions.' ' 145 To Madison, Pennsylvania's experience only confirmed the ancient rule that "democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."' 46
The Convention's eventual adoption of a unitary executive with a veto
power and a bicameral legislature with a strong upper house made the
structure of the U.S. Constitution the "direct antithesis of Pennsylvania's
47
frame of government."'
The Court's contemporary embrace of a federally imposed template of
radical democracy is ahistorical in another important way: it ignores the
original motivation behind the Constitution's complex interpenetration of
state and national power to govern the national political process, and indeed turns those reasons on their heads. Under the U.S. Constitution, the
power to regulate federal elections does not lie, as one might expect, with
139Id.
139See Williams, supra note 126, at
570-71.
140 Id. at 572-73; see also MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA ch. 7 (1997).

141 See Williams, supra note 126, at 584.
142 See id. at 574-75.
143Id.at 576.

144MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 32, at 39 (quoting Elbridge Gerry (May 31, 1787)).
145Williams, supra note 126, at 575 (quoting Edmund Randolph).
146THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
147Williams, supra note 126, at 577.
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the federal government. Instead, such power is shared with state governments in a surprisingly byzantine arrangement. 4 For example, qualifica149
tions for voting in federal elections are set by each state individually.
The power to regulate the time, place and manner of congressional elections is vested, in the first instance, in the states, subject to revision by
Congress.' The power to determine how presidential electors are selected
is awarded to the states,' although Congress retains a residual, inherent
power to regulate some aspects of presidential elections." 2
These provisions seem surprising today because they grant to states the
power to exercise significant control over the course of federal elections.
Yet that was precisely their purpose. As much as they complained of the
excesses of state power, many of the Framers feared national power even
more. State control over national electoral politics was understood as a
way to preclude the kind of national tyranny that might be expected were
the national government given the power to regulate the very political processes that would produce it.' 3 Thus, Congress was deliberately given no
role whatsoever in the election of the President; control over that process
was instead allocated to the states." 4 The success of this arrangement at
thwarting national tyranny obviously presupposes that states will operate
independently of the federal government in making decisions about how to
regulate the political environment.
The constitutional structure of mixed regulatory power was also understood explicitly to offer states protection against undue meddling by the
national government in state political processes. For example, the Framers
decided to grant states the power to set qualifications to vote in federal
elections because they did not wish to impose a uniform national standard
of voter eligibility on the states. In the 1780s, states differed widely in the
degree to which they granted the franchise. A federal decision to distribute
the national franchise more generously than it was distributed in some of
the states would, it was feared, soon provoke popular pressure for expansion of the franchise in those states that fell below the national norm.'
Thus, the constitutional structure of electoral regulation contemplates
considerable state autonomy over internal political processes, an autonomy
that states have long used to shape and to reform their electoral politics.
148 See U.S. CONST. art. I.
149Id. art. 1,§ 2, cl.

1.

150Id. art. 1,
§ 4, cl. 1.
151 Id.

art. 11,§ l,cl. 2.
152 Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662
(1884).
153Id. at 358-69.
154U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 1, cl.
2.
155As James Wilson observed, "[lit would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons
at
the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for
those in the Nat'l Legislature." MADISON'S NOTES, supra note 32, at 401.
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Indeed, the American record of political reform is written overwhelmingly
at the state and local levels. The Jacksonian revolution in expansion of the
franchise, for example, left no trace upon the U.S. Constitution; it was effected entirely at the state level through the elimination of restrictive state
constitutional property qualifications.'56 Progressivism rewrote the rules of
politics in significant ways, yet its influence on the U.S. Constitution was
minimal, resulting only in direct election of Senators and extension of the
vote to women."5 7 On the state level, in contrast, Progressive influence
brought a host of reforms including initiatives and referenda; term limits;
recall elections; nonpartisanship in local and judicial elections; and in some
cases even proportional representation and unicameralism."5 '
The Supreme Court's current intrusions into state politics in the name
of radical democracy run sharply counter to this longstanding tradition of
state autonomy and innovation in the conduct of state politics. Where the
Framers meant to preserve state autonomy to structure state politics, the
Court has construed the Constitution to undermine state autonomy and
squelch innovation by subjecting all states to a single, federally constitutionalized, Procrustean model of state political processes.'5 9 And where the
Framers intended to allow states to influence national politics, the Court
has construed the Constitution to do just the opposite: to require deep national intrusions into state political processes.
B. The ConceptualIncoherence of the Court's Embrace ofRadical
Democracy
The Court's embrace of radical democracy does not merely run counter
to historical constitutional commitments; it is also, on its own merits, conceptually incoherent in at least two significant ways. First, as I have already explained, the Court's jurisprudential drift results from an erroneous
conflation of radical democracy and radical egalitarianism, two conceptually distinct political ideas. Second, the Court has developed its brand of
constitutional radical democracy opportunistically, and consequently has
applied and enforced it inconsistently. As a result, the Court has succeeded
at best in creating only isolated pockets of radical democracy in the interstices of a system dominated by distinctly unmajoritarian features-features that the Court has consistently approved as constitutionally sound.
156KEYSSAR, supra note 23, at 28-30, 42-52.
157See U.S. CONST. amends XVII, § 1, XIX,
§ 1.
158 For descriptions of the Progressive reform agenda in politics, see RICHARD S. CHILDS, CIVIC
VICTORIES: THE STORY OF AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1952); RICHARD S. CHILDS, THE FIRST 50
YEARS OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (1965); BENJAMIN PARKE DE
WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN, COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT
TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1915); GEORGE H. HALLETT, JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION -THE KEY TO DEMOCRACY (1937); HOFSTADTER, supra note 30.
159See supra Part I.C.
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As demonstrated in Part I, the Court's grounds for intervening in state
elections began to shift, around the time of its decision in Buckley v. Valeo,
from enforcing a regime of radical egalitarianism to one of radical democracy. This has caused the Court, in the name of protecting constitutional
liberty, to move from striking down laws that are in some sense inegalitarian to striking down laws that are in some sense undemocratic. Yet, as
discussed earlier, the kinds of inegalitarian regulations of politics that drew
the Court's early fire typically caused some groups to be excluded from
politics, whereas the undemocratic regulations of politics that have offended the Court more recently often simply regulate (equally) the behavior of actors in politics. This is an important distinction.
The inegalitarian exclusion of people from politics distorts the political
process regardless of how that process may be defined. If we are willing to
make the single and, in today's world, entirely uncontroversial assumption
that all adults posses a minimally adequate degree of political competence,
then the exclusion of any particular class of adults from participation in
political processes distorts those processes by diverting from the political
system inputs that must by hypothesis be taken into account when generating political outcomes. Exclusion thus becomes very difficult to justify:
it directly infringes the liberty of those excluded by denying them participation rights to which they are entitled; and it damages the political liberty
of all by depriving the polity of a properly functioning political process.
The Constitution is rightly understood to condemn such exclusion. This
condemnation, moreover, is entirely independent of the details of the political processes from which people may be unequally excluded. On the
assumption of minimal competence appearing in cases such as Harper and
Kramer, exclusion from just about any kind of basically democratic political process will be equally difficult to justify.
It does not follow, however, that laws constraining the behavior of
people in politics either distort political processes or deprive political actors of any particular kind of constitutionally protected liberty. Undemocratic features of American political systems often are justified precisely as
measures designed to protect liberty, either by shielding minorities from
unconstrained majoritarianism, or by assuring the overall stability of the
political system. 60 Thus, laws that bar political actors from behaving in
ways that the state disfavors cannot be said ipso facto to distort politics;
they might just as easily be designed to protect political processes from
distortion and thus to assure that political behavior conforms to norms pre160For

example, the Senate has been said to do both: it shields minorities from the passions of the

majority, to which the House may give effect, and in so doing stabilizes the political system by evening
out its course and preventing it from taking ill-advised actions. George Washington is said to have
likened the Senate to a saucer into which one poured one's hot tea to let it cool before returning it to the
cup. See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments. and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 247, 285 (1996).
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supposed by the structure of state political institutions.
The only way in which legal constraints on political behavior can be
understood without more as distortions of the political process and infringements of constitutionally guaranteed participation rights is if one
reads into the Constitution a mandatory model of radical democracy-that
is, a constitutionalized norm of unconstrained behavior in politics. As
shown above, such a norm lacks any basis in the relevant constitutional
history or structure. 161 But there is also no particular reason to think that
such a norm is the only one the Constitution will tolerate, or even that it is
an especially appealing one. American constitutionalism has already
proven itself broad enough and flexible enough to accommodate such divergent political ideologies as republicanism, populism, and Progressivism,
among others. I see no basis for concluding that it has somehow been rendered incapable of accommodating at least some range of contemporary
models of politics and political behavior. Certainly nothing in the arc of
development of American democratic institutions points unequivocally
62
toward an inevitable end in a politics of unconstrained individualism.1
A second way in which the Court's embrace of radical democracy is
incoherent is in its opportunism. As detailed above, in pursuing its vision
of radical democracy, the Court has, for example, invalidated restrictions
on campaign speech and spending; prohibited the pursuit of racial balance
in legislative politics; and weighed in against limitations on the scope of
state legislative power in regulating federal elections.163 These actions, the
Court seems to believe, clear obstructions to the assertion of majoritarian
political power by freeing individual political actors to pursue without constraint their objectives in the political process and by liberating legislatures
to respond to the majority's will in the course of managing the political
process.
At the same time, however, the American political process is heavily
structured by all manner of regulatory institutions that severely compromise its majoritarianism. On the federal level, the Senate and the Electoral
College are only the most prominent impediments to majority rule."' Below the constitutional level, however, many deeply entrenched, common161

See discussion supra Part II.A.

162See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, TALES OF ANEW AMERICA (1987) (in which Reich describes the
"triumphant individual" as only one of four competing national mythologies. An equally prevalent
American mythological archetype, according to Reich, is "the benevolent community.")
163 See discussion supra Part I.C.
164 Horizontal separation of powers on the state and national levels, and
vertical separation of
powers, in the form of federalism, also impede the implementation of policy by popular majorities.
The federal versions of these policies are of course constitutionalized and the Supreme Court has never
suggested the possibility of federal constitutional difficulties with the state-level versions, with the one
major exception of state equivalents of the U.S. Senate. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the
Court invalidated under the Fourteenth Amendment state senates in which representation was not
allocated consistent with the principle of one-person, one-vote.
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place institutions work constantly against majoritarian political controlinstitutions that the Court has not only left intact, but has expressly
approved and often upheld against constitutional attack. For example, the
widespread practice of single-member districting is a deeply
antimajoritarian political institution that can permit a minority to control a
majority of seats in a multimember legislative body.t"' Yet the potential
antidemocratic operation of single-member districting has never troubled
the Court. On the contrary, the Court has often identified single-member
districting as a preferred remedy for other constitutional violations.' A
similarly antimajoritarian effect is achieved through the almost universal
American practice of utilizing a plurality winner format in which the
highest vote-getter wins office outright even if he or she fails to attract
majority

support.'67

Yet

the

Court

has

never

questioned

the

constitutionality of this practice even though it can severely impair the
responsiveness of government to majority sentiment.
Indeed, by
establishing a constitutional requirement of decennial redistricting, the
Court's one-person, one-vote rulings exacerbate the antimajoritarian
impact of these structures by creating recurring opportunities for minority
parties in power to gerrymander district lines so as to secure majority status
in the halls of government. 68
' In this regard, the Court has even approved a
kind of bipartisan redistricting agreement in which evenly matched parties
agreed to divide up a state in a way that virtually eliminated the possibility
of sensitive governmental responsiveness to the will of subsequent
electoral majorities. 69
In this way, the Court has frequently approved and permitted electoral
and regulatory mechanisms in some political arenas that work directly
against its attempts to entrench radical democracy in other areas. This
haphazard, opportunistic approach results in a political regulatory structure
165

For example, suppose a 100-person jurisdiction has a 10-seat legislature, with 10 voters

electing one member from each of 10 legislative districts. Suppose that among the 100 voters are 40
Democrats and 60 Republicans. If district lines are drawn such that 6 districts contain 6 Democrats and
4 Republicans, with the other voters scattered among the remaining four districts, the Democrats will
win 6 out of 10 seats, even though they comprise only 40% of the voting population. Similar results
may be obtained, and with less manipulation, when there is a minor third party and neither major party
commands majority support
166 See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (stating that, in Fourteenth Amendment
vote dilution cases, "this Court has concluded that single-member districts are to be preferred in courtordered legislative reapportionment plans").
167 In most states, this feature has been constitutionalized. See, e.g., APIZ. CONST. art. 7, §
7
(plurality winner in all elections); CoNN. CONST. art. 3, § 7 (legislative elections); FLA. CONST. art. 6, §
I (general elections); MASS. CONST. art. 14 (all elections). Only Vermont requires a true majority of
votes in executive branch elections. VT. CONST. ch. I1,§ 47.
168 For a recent exchange on the ability of incumbents to gerrymander themselves into secure
districts, compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593
(2002), with Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REv. 649 (2002).
169 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).

1496

CONNECTICUT LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 35:1467

that is largely incoherent in that it leaves a regulatory system whose different parts pull in contradictory directions. 7 '
C. The Dangersof an UnconstrainableDemocraticPolitics
Ultimately, the most significant problem with the emerging guarantee
of radical democracy is that it jeopardizes achievement of the very goals to
which democracy as a political institution most aspires: equality and
popular sovereignty. Invalidating restrictions on the political behavior of
political actors may, in many cases, improve the quality of popular control
over government-but only when the limitations on political behavior at
issue actually distort democratic outcomes. Not all constraints on political
behavior have such an effect. Many, in fact, are meant to do just the opposite-protect democratic processes from impairment by inappropriate influences. 7' To strike down indiscriminately virtually all regulatory restrictions on political behavior opens up the political process, but not necessarily to the right kind of influences. In my view, the Court's movement
toward radical democracy has already begun to create a politics so wide
open that it is dangerously vulnerable to dominance by plutocratic factions,
a condition far removed from any kind of broad-based popular sovereignty.
The most obvious example of this is the increasing ability of individuals and narrow interest groups to gain disproportionate attention for themselves, and thus to influence electoral results, by spending large amounts of
money in electoral politics. Jon Corzine spent $62 million of his own
money in his successful 2000 run for a New Jersey Senate seat. 72 Ross
Perot spent $60 million from his personal fortune in the 1992 presidential
race, in which he received 19 million votes.'73 In the 2002 New York gubernatorial election, Independence Party candidate Tom Golisano broke the
record for a nonpresidential candidate by spending over $73 million of his
170 To say nothing of its lack of any overarching theory. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and
Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411 (2002).
171 This is the rationale behind nonpartisanship or restrictions on campaign spending. Of course,
to accept this proposition one must accept the premises about politics that underlie the restrictionsthat unrestrained partisan competition can be destructive or that unrestrained political spending corrupts
the formation of public opinion.
172 Editorial, Millions of Reasons to Reform Campaign Financing, NEWSDAY (New York), Dec.
20, 2000, at A48, LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY File.
173 See Associated Press, Perot Spent $56 Million of Own, $4.5 Million in Loans on Race, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1992, A25, LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (noting that Perot "reported spending more
than $64 million on his independent bid ... all but $3.9 million of it his own money-a record for selfpaid campaigns"); Daryl Kelley, Perot Supporters Say Movement is Just Beginning: The Billionaire's
Local Backers are Buoyed By His 27% Share of the County's Vote. They Look Toward 1996, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at BI, LEXIS, News Library, LAT File (observing that Perot's 1992 presidential
campaign drew 19 million votes, establishing him as "the most successful independent candidate in
recent U.S. history").
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own money, collecting 14 percent of the vote.
It is clear that what distinguished these men was neither their experience-none had previously
held elected office' 7 -nor their views-which no doubt were shared by
many in the jurisdictions in which they ran-but their ability to put their
hands on millions of dollars of personal financial resources. Surely something is wrong when the political stage can be captured, and the political
agenda consequently determined, for no reason other than that a single,
extremely rich person wishes to do so.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Republican Party v. White, described
earlier,'76 seems particularly misguided in this regard, since it can only
extend the growing influence of money to judicial elections. Even before
the White decision, money had started flowing into judicial races in ever
greater amounts. 177 The effectiveness of this spending might well have
been dampened by the restrictions on substantive campaigning invalidated78
by the Court, or so a state legislature might reasonably have believed.'
After White, judicial candidates may speak to any substantive issue, a development that threatens to make judicial elections look like every other
kind of race, and increase the number of points at which infusions of
money might prove influential.
The Court's approach in its recent cases prohibits states from attempting to work out structural solutions to what they might legitimately view as
the structural problems of politics. Indeed, the Court's approach seems to
deny that politics exhibits problems of a structural nature, or perhaps even
that in its unregulated state it exhibits anything that could be deemed a
problem at all. Therein lies the ultimate defect in the Court's constitutionalization of radical democracy: it takes control over state politics from
state polities and transfers it to federal courts. 179 A state polity's beliefs
174 Shaila K. Dewan, Spending in Governor's Race Goes in Record Books Twice, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 3, 2002, at B6.
175 See Jordan Rau, Golisano Playing the Wild Card: Volatile Variable in the Governors Race,
NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. 27, 2002, at A3, LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY File (observing that
Golisano has never held public office); Stevenson Swanson, Big Names Take On Biggest Money in
N.J.: Contest Pits Political Currency Against $60 Million Bid, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2000 at N6, LEXIS,
News Library, CHTRIB File (noting that Corzine has never held public office); Letta Taylor, The Race
for the White House, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 1, 1992 (Voter's Guide), at 3, LEXIS, News Library, NEWSDY File (observing that Perot has never held public office).
176 See supra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
77See DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: HOW 2000
WAS A WATERSHED YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE, AND TV ADVERTISING IN
STATE SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGNS (2002).
178 Although it must be conceded that the state's inability to restrict independent expenditures for
and against particular judicial candidates under the rule of Buckley v. Valeo might have already made
restrictions on the behavior of the candidates themselves superfluous.
179 Richard Pildes has made a similar observation. See Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing
Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME

COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 156 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) (exploring the "constitutionali-
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about political life, its choices of political institutions, and its preferences
for exercising regulatory authority count for nothing. This represents a
fundamental error.
III. STATE CONTROL OVER STATE POLITICS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

In his opinion in Colegrove v. Green,' Justice Frankfurter issued his
now-famous warning against the Court's entry into what he termed the
"political thicket..''. History has borne out the wisdom of the Court's decision to ignore the warning. State politics may be a jungle, but at the time
of the Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,'82 it was a jungle choked by
harmful undergrowth. Some state legislatures had become corrupt and
83
unrepresentative due to a self-perpetuating domination by rural interests.
Unsavory practices in the distribution of the franchise assured the continued exclusion of underrepresented groups, particularly racial minorities,
from the political process.8 4 The Court's interventions into state politics
opened the process to excluded and underrepresented groups, producing an
undeniably greater equality of opportunity to influence political outcomes.
Still, there are many different ways to clear a thicket. One might tread
lightly, carefully identifying and preserving the native species and their
habitats in an attempt to restore a healthy ecological balance. Or one might
burst in like some kind of mall developer, indiscriminately bulldozing everything in pursuit of some cheaply contrived master plan. As I hope I have
made plain, it seems to me that the Court has acted lately more like a franchise developer, installing one Gap, one Banana Republic, and one Radio
Shack into every state political system, whether the locals want them or
not. Surely there is a better way to proceed, one that will allow federal
courts to do what they have always done best-purge state politics of diszation of democratic politics" and characterizing it as "the single most important development in constitutional law over the last decade").
IS0 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
Id. at 556.
182

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
e.g., ROBERT G.

183 See,

DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN

58-98, 82 (1968); Vladimer 0. Key, Jr., Procedures in State Legislative Apportionment, 26 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1050 (1932); Timothy G. O'Rourke, The Impact of Reapportionment
on Congress and State Legislatures, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING INTHE UNITED STATES
195-200, 198 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
LAW AND POLITICS

184

These included literacy tests, discriminatory felon disenfranchisement laws, discriminatory

administration of voter registration, and many other techniques. See generally KEYSSAR, supra note
23, at 105-16, 151-63; J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler David-

son & Bernard Grofman, eds., 1994).
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criminatory and exclusionary devices-while allowing states a substantial

measure of discretion to construct a politics that conforms to their own
preferences.
Recent developments reveal starkly a strongly held belief in many
states that the national, cookie-cutter model of politics is inadequate in
certain basic respects. For example, in the last decade alone fourteen states
have chosen to impose term limits on state legislators. 5 Arizona, Maine,
Massachusetts, and Vermont have adopted substantial systems of public
financing for elections." 6 Colorado, Missouri, Montana, and Vermont
have drastically lowered the ceiling for allowable financial contributions to
candidates.'
Connecticut has banned soft money contributions to state
political parties.' Alaska, California and Washington have attempted to
maintain a system of blanket primaries." 9 Thirteen states are presently
considering measures to ban exit polling in certain circumstances.9 0 Add
to this list such long-standing, idiosyncratic preferences as Nebraska's unicameral, nonpartisan legislature, 9 ' for example, and it becomes clear that
there is considerable demand in the states for state-level solutions to publicly perceived problems with state-level politics.
It is not just the variety of state preferences that is noteworthy here, but
the grounds upon which such preferences diverge. Different policy preferences on measures such as term limits or campaign finance clearly reflect
differing assumptions at a much deeper level about voter competence, the
kind of political leadership that is desirable, and the appropriate allocation
of authority between rulers and ruled. Such preferences, that is to say, im185 A total of twenty-two states currently impose such limits. State Legislative Term Limits, at

http://www.termlimits.org/Current-Info/State_Tliindex.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2003) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review).
186 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-940 to 961 (West Supp. 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 21-A,

§§ 1121 to 1128 (West Supp. 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A, §§ I to 18 (West 1991 & Supp.
2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2851 to 2856 (2002).
187 See COLO. CONST. art. 28, §§ I to 14, § 3 (placing a $500 campaign contribution limit on gu-

bernatorial candidates and a $200 limit on legislative candidates); MO. ANN. STAT. § 130.110 (West
1997 & Supp. 2003) (imposing a $25 cap on anonymous campaign contributions and a $100 cap on
aggregate campaign contributions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216 (2001) (placing a $400 campaign
contribution limit on gubernatorial candidates, a $200 limit on state candidates, and a $100 limit on all
other offices); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (2002) (imposing a $200 cap on campaign contributions
to state representatives, a $300 cap on contributions to senatorial candidates, and a $400 cap on contributions to gubernatorial candidates).
188 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-333n (2000 & Supp. 2003).
189 California's blanket primary was invalidated in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U.S. 567 (2000). The Alaska Supreme Court had previously upheld Alaska's blanket primary against a
similar challenge. See O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1263 (Alaska 1996). Washington has for
many years also used a blanket primary format. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.200 (West 1993).
190 See Greg McDonald, Election Reform, (Oct. 2002), at http://stateline.org/issue.do?issueld
=481 (last visited Jan. 31, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
191NEB. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1, 7.
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plicate concepts that are fundamental building blocks of any state's public
theory of politics. Consider term limits, for example. The strongest argument against mandatory term limits is that voters are never precluded from
imposing term limits whenever they please because they may always simply refuse to re-elect an incumbent. This argument is unassailable on its
own assumptions-assumptions that voters are rational and informed, and
that they vote their long-term self-interest. A decision to make term limits
mandatory clearly rejects those assumptions and thus embodies an important judgment that a state's voters lack, in some important respect, a capacity for self-discipline, or perhaps even for political understanding. For
federal courts willy-nilly to invalidate divergent state political institutions
under the federal Constitution does much more than simply impose uniformity in political institutions; it also amounts to a denial of a state's
authority to make independent judgments about how politics is and ought
to be conducted.
It seems to me that it ought to be possible to devise a more ecologically
sensitive mode of federal judicial oversight of state political processes that
would enable federal courts to vindicate legitimate national constitutional
interests, while at the same time respecting the local political flora and
fauna and preserving their native habitats. Although this is not the place to
attempt to work out anything like a complete theory of federal oversight of
state political processes, it is possible nevertheless to venture preliminarily
a few broad principles that might inform such a theory.
A. There Is No Single ConstitutionalModel ofPolitics
The U.S. Constitution was framed for the purpose of implementing a
politics of republicanism in which a natural aristocracy of impartial leaders
would govern their political inferiors. The plan did not work. Ever since,
prevailing public conceptions of politics have continually changed and
evolved. The Constitution has proven flexible enough to accommodate
many different models of politics and can easily accommodate many more.
It should not be used today to impose upon states an intrusive degree of
uniformity by reading it to permit only a narrow set of institutional structures suitable for serving only a single normative conception of democratic
politics.
B. The Availability of CongressionalReview of State Regulation of
National PoliticsReduces the Needfor Aggressive FederalJudicial
Oversight
The national government obviously has a far stronger interest in managing national political processes than it does in managing state politics.
The question, however, is not whether the national government should
oversee its politics, but how it should do so. Article I, section 4 of the U.S.
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Constitution explicitly authorizes Congress to alter state regulation of the
times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections.192 Article II,
section 1 has been interpreted, correctly in my view, to permit some congressional regulation of the presidential election process.'9 3 These provisions give Congress ample power to invalidate state regulatory practices it
deems improper. Federal courts thus share with Congress the authority to
invalidate state regulations of national politics.
In view of this power sharing arrangement, federal judicialoversight of
state regulation of national politics may appropriately be conducted with a
somewhat lesser sense of urgency than the Supreme Court currently displays. To the Court, every regulatory measure that prohibits even a very
small number of political actors from doing in the political arena every
single thing they wish to do often is treated as a full-blown constitutional
emergency requiring immediate, decisive judicial intervention. Yet it may
be significant, and worthy of judicial consideration, that Congress, which is
free to overturn state measures on a much wider variety of grounds than
those to which the Court may resort, may be untroubled by measures that
evoke judicial suspicion.' 4 As Justice White observed in Buckley, Congress contains "many seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over
many years," and it may thus be presumptuous of the Court to "[claim]
more insight" than professional politicians concerning the need for and
likely impact of regulatory measures.' 95
Nonetheless, there are surely some reasons to be skeptical of Congress's inclination to overturn questionable state regulation of national
electoral processes.' 96 The beneficiaries of such regulation may very well
be sitting in Congress and in a position to impede legislative reform. National political parties, which are sometimes capable of bridging state and
national politics,'9 7 may be able to impose a uniform discipline on members
192 U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 4, cl. 1.
93

1 See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
194

Cf. Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional Law in Bush

v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 661, 682 (2001) (by "federalizing state election codes" in Bush v.
Gore, the Court was "offering assistance that Congress did not seek").
195 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 261 (1976) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in
part).
196 Congress has exercised this power rarely, though this is not necessarily evidence of
a structural inability to do so. It did not exercise the power at all until the Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat.
491 (1842) (requiring elections by district), and has not used it much since. Through more than two
centuries, the principal body of law regulating federal elections has always been, and remains, state
law, which governs virtually every aspect of federal elections from the drawing of district lines, to the
methods of nominating candidates, to the means of casting and counting ballots.
197 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100
COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000).
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of state legislatures and Congress, thereby undermining the kind of congressional independence from state politics that Article I, section 4 seems
to presuppose. Nevertheless, it is one thing to acknowledge that Congress
may have disincentives to regulate and quite another for the Court to behave as though it alone stands between state authority and the destruction
of national democratic politics. In many other areas where the Court and
Congress share responsibility for monitoring state behavior, such as the
regulation of commerce or civil rights enforcement, the Court has readily
acknowledged the importance of congressional oversight.198 In these areas,
the Court has lately focused its attention as much or more on monitoring
the way in which Congress supervises state activities as it has on substantive compliance with constitutional norms by states themselves.'9 9 It is not
apparent why the Court could not utilize such an approach in exercising
with Congress joint responsibility to police state regulation of national
elections.
C. States Are Entitled to Some Deference in Their Choice of Ends and
Means in the Regulation of Politics
The preceding two propositions readily yield a third: when the Court
does decide to review state regulation of political processes, it should accord states at least some measure of deference. Presently it accords them
none. Historically, when the Court has imposed a regime of demanding
judicial review on state activities it has done so because something about
the nature of the activity itself has raised suspicion about the motivations
with which states have acted. That is why state laws that classify on the
basis of race, for example, or with respect to a fundamental right, draw
immediate and skeptical judicial review. In contrast, all state regulation of
political processes need not be treated as inherently suspicious.20 Despite
198 The preeminent examples are probably South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337
(1966) (holding portions of the Voting Rights Act valid), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
658 (1966) (holding that part of the Voting Rights Act was "appropriate legislation"), in which the
Court substantially deferred to congressional judgment regarding the appropriate way to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment against the states. Outside the civil rights area, the Court's entire dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, for example, is built on a presumption equating lack of congressional
action with a congressional preference for regulatory noninterference by the states.
199The Court has closely scrutinized, for example, the way Congress invokes its shared authority
to regulate interstate commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the way it chooses to
create enforcement mechanisms in subjecting states to commercial regulation, Bd. of Trustees v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), and the way Congress implements its power to enforce civil rights, City
of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 501, (1997).
200 The Court has sometimes acknowledged as much, though only with respect to a relatively narrow set of subjects, such as state regulation of access to the official ballot. For example, the Court has
often recognized that states have legitimate interests in regulating the number of candidates on the
ballot and protecting the political process from frivolous candidacies. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
718-19 (1974) (holding that an indigent candidate who cannot pay a filing fee "may be required to
demonstrate the 'seriousness' of his candidacy"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (stating
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what the Court often seems to assume, democratic politics is not something
that happens spontaneously, thereby transforming any and all government
regulation of politics into a distortion of politics as it would otherwise
emerge in some hypothetical, "natural," unregulated form. Politics always
occurs within institutional structures, whether they are structures of a wideopen, radically democratic, market-style politics or of some other kind.20'
Those who become immediately suspicious of any and all state regulation of politics generally do so for one of two reasons: either they (1) implicitly judge political institutions against a baseline conception of demo-

cratic politics as radical democracy; or (2) assume that all regulation of
politics is best understood as an attempt by the regulating body to entrench
or increase its own political advantage through the instrumental manipulation of institutional structures. Neither consideration adequately justifies
the suspicion. First, as I have already explained, there is no good reason to
read into the U.S. Constitution a baseline preference for radical democracy,

while there are many good reasons to reject it. This is not necessarily to
say that a coherent legislative plan to implement a regime of radical democracy might not be entitled to some deference when reviewed against

constitutional standards, but that is very different from saying that radical
democracy constitutes the default preference of the U.S. Constitution.
Second, the idea that all legislative regulation of politics can only be understood as self-interested proves far too much. The fact that some political interests may benefit in the short term from any regulation of the
structure of politics cannot negate the possibility that a legislative reform
might nevertheless represent an overall institutional improvement. To
deny this is to make an impoverished, reductionist argument which at botthat "nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees or
licensing fees in other contexts"). Moreover, in some of its more recent ballot access cases, the Court
has more formally recognized the legitimacy of at least some regulation of the political process by
introducing a two-tiered system of constitutional scrutiny in which severe intrusions on constitutionally
protected rights are given strict scrutiny, but lesser intrusions are evaluated under a less rigorous balancing standard.
S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters put the point well more than forty years ago:
We can only say that "the people" has a will if it is organized by some sort of voting
procedure, which operates to decide only questions of certain understood types. But
then, whether "the people" (or the electorate) wills to be governed by the Labour or the
Conservative Party may well depend on what methods are used for voting and counting
votes and on how the constituencies are drawn. The will of the people cannot be determined independently of the particular procedure employed, for it is not a natural will,
nor is it a sum of similar wills of persons sharing a common interest, but the result of
going through a procedure which weighs some wills against others.
S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 397 (First Free Press Paperback
ed., 1965) (1959). This notion has only been reinforced by more recent work in social choice theory
revealing the difficult conceptual problems that come from attempting to conceive coherently of a
politics divorced from any concrete institutional and procedural setting. See KENNETH J. ARROW,
SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (4th prtg., 2d ed. 1963); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE (1982).
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tom denies the possibility of evaluating political institution--or indeed any
kinds of laws-on their merits, rather than in terms of who benefits from
them in the short term.
D. FederalJudicialReview Should Focus Less on Whether States Allow
PoliticalActors to Act Without Constraintthan on Whether States
Provide in Fact the PoliticalFreedom they Promise in Theory
When the Court first began intervening in state politics, it focused primarily on problems relating to exclusion. It lost its way when it began to
make judgments about the degree to which the behavior of actors within
the political system established by the state might or might not constitutionally be constrained. The Court needs to recover its earlier focus on
exclusion.2 2 The question of whether a state's political system offers political actors a constitutionally adequate range of opportunities to participate in politics needs to be detached from the question of whether the
state's political system actually permits political actors to enjoy the opportunities to participate that the system in theory guarantees them. Both are
legitimate areas of constitutional inquiry. Yet, as I have indicated, the first
question may be addressed in a way that exhibits some deference to the
choices made by the state in choosing to cultivate one form of politics over
another. The second question, in contrast, demands strict and uncompromising judicial review. The twin dangers of distortion of political outcomes and self-entrenchment by those in power are greatest not when the
state chooses from among a potentially broad range of roughly democratic
political institutions, but when it rigs whatever system it chooses to produce preordained results. No political system can work properly when it is
administered in a way that is inconsistent with the very assumptions about
political behavior that justify its institutional structures.
IV. CONCLUSION

I conclude by considering briefly how the principles outlined above
might apply to a problem that arose with dismaying frequency in the 2002
election cycle: the late substitution of candidates for federal office on account of their withdrawal or death.20 3 It is not going out on much of a limb
to say that the way the Court has handled similar issues in the past suggests
202

It has not totally abandoned this aspect of its jurisprudence.

A recent example is Rice v.

Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 498-99 (2000), in which the Court invalidated a provision of Hawaii law
establishing native Hawaiian descent as a qualification to vote in elections for trustees of a trust established for the benefit of native Hawaiians.
203 In addition to the instances from New Jersey, Minnesota and Hawaii noted in the introduction,
at least one other candidate dropped out of a race: the Republican candidate for Montana's Senate seat
withdrew less than a month before the election while trailing badly in the polls. Michael Janofsky,
Montana Candidate, Citing Smear Campaign, Ends Senate Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A22.
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that the practice of late substitutions raises several potential constitutional
issues. For example, refusing to allow a substitution deprives the voting
public of a meaningful choice, possibly implicating their right to vote. It
also deprives members of the withdrawn candidate's party of their associational interest in advancing a standard-bearer to spread their message in the
general election. In a non-statewide race, it might also be said to create
arbitrary differences in the value of the.right to vote across a state's election jurisdictions on a Bush v. Gore theory.
On the other hand, the general practice of permitting a substitute to be
selected by party officials rather than by rerunning the primary election
might implicate the associational rights of party rank-and-file, who are
deprived of the opportunity to participate in the selection of the party association's candidate. The practice of late substitution also might be thought
to harm the remaining candidate and his or her supporters in that they may
lack a meaningful opportunity to tailor their political message to the opponent they actually face, and may well have expended most of their political
speech resources in ways that are suddenly and without warning rendered
irrelevant to the issues ultimately framed by the election. Finally, the participation of the state judiciary in the process of deciding whether substitutions are permitted might implicate issues arising under Article I, § Section
4 to the extent that a judicial decision might be thought to displace decisions made by, and committed to the exclusive discretion of, the state legislature.
Now, it is possible that each and every one of these potential arguments has an answer, and that a well-crafted state statute, administered
fairly and impartially by state courts, might successfully navigate all the
possible constitutional dangers regardless of whether the state chooses to
permit or to forbid late substitution of candidates. I wish to make a different point. In my view, a state simply should not have to face this kind of
federal constitutional obstacle course whenever it chooses among possible
institutional formats for elections.2" Normally, a state should be free to
permit or to forbid late substitutions of candidates because either choice is
very likely to be reasonable.
It is helpful here to think about the ways in which choices among
electoral institutions reflect competing conceptions of politics. A decision
freely to permit parties to substitute candidates suggests a relatively partycentered conception of electoral politics. Substitutions, on this model, are
not particularly important because different candidates running for the
same office from the same party are likely to hold similar substantive
204

For a similar observation, see Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Pro-

tection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. REv. 377 (2001).
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views-the views of the party. Freely allowing substitutions thus strengthens party identity and party influence over electoral politics. In contrast, a
decision to forbid or to disfavor substitutions suggests a candidate-centered
conception of electoral politics. Each candidate is understood to offer voters a choice that is unique. On this model, candidates are not fungible even
when they hold identical policy views because elections are not, or are not
only, about policies; they are also about personalities. To restrict substitutions thus weakens parties and the importance of party identification.
A state should be entirely free to embrace either of these conceptions
of party politics, and to attempt to institutionalize the chosen model by
regulatory means. By the same token, federal courts should not be in the
business of displacing these kinds of choices by taking the position that
politics is "really" about policies, or about personalities, or about some
combination of the two, or about something else altogether. The only way
for a federal court to make such a determination would be to read into the
Constitution an indefeasible model of politics that differs from the one
adopted by the state. This is not to say that the federal Constitution has no
bearing on the kinds of political systems states may adopt. A state's political system may not be monarchical or aristocratic.2 5 It must be
republican."° It must institutionalize some form of popular sovereignty.0 7
It must extend the franchise broadly and fairly.2 " But these and other constitutional constraints should be understood to leave states with a broad
range of constitutionally acceptable political models and implementing
institutions from which to choose, and considerable discretion about how
to go about choosing among them.
Given a long American history of gradual nationwide convergence of
cultural and political values,2°9 it seems highly unlikely that a state would
adopt a conceptual model of politics or a set of political institutions that
would diverge significantly from the national norm, even if it had the discretion to do so. Still, the main stream of American political thought is
broad. There is value in permitting individual state polities to choose
where within the range of prevailing ideas and traditions to locate themselves, and there are benefits to be gained from permitting states, through
institutional innovation, to carry on among themselves and with the national polity a dialogue about how best to institutionalize our common p0205

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.I.

206 Id. art. IV, §
4.

207 See THE FEDERALIST, No. 39., at 241 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (to be "republican" it is "essential [that a government] "be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it," and it is "sufficientfor such a government that the
persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people .....
208 U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
209 See JAMES A. GARDNER, Federalism and the Problem of Political Subcommunities, in To
PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE: A COMMUNITARIAN LEGAL READER (David E. Carney ed., 1999).
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beliefs.1

litical traditions and
The Supreme Court's recent effort to impose uniform institutions of
radical democracy on state politics deprives us of these benefits. It impedes innovation, and squelches the development of public political
thought, particularly concerning the feasibility and desirability of legal
institutions that structure political relations. The Court obviously believes
that in defending every individual's ability to behave in politics without
significant legal restraint it is protecting and expanding political freedom,
and in so doing performing the vital function of forcing state-level politics
to be free. This hubristic approach is misguided. The radically democratic
model to which the Court adheres lacks a solid grounding in the Constitution, is not generally accepted today as a desirable model of politics, and
appears to work in practice so as to put at risk the very values the Court
seemingly has deployed it to serve.

210 See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.

REv. 1147 (1993).

